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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts for some time now have been forced to deal with the validity of
covenants not to compete as contained in employment contracts.1 Consid-
ered to be a restraint against trade,2 these covenants under common law
were viewed with disfavor, if not hostility, both nationally and in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, as being contrary to the American ideals of
individual freedom, competition, and the free flow of commerce. As such
they were seldom upheld. It was only after the courts recognized that em-
ployers had legitimate concerns and interests worthy of protections that
reasonable covenants not to compete began to be enforced by injunction
following a breach.4
1. Cases dealing with covenants not to compete which involve the sale of a business or
pension plans are not covered in this article. Covenants not to compete as found in em-
ployer-employee contracts are distinguished from covenants not to compete as found in sale
of businesses and are more strongly limited as to the scope of permissible restraint. Alston
Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 1974). For a Virginia
case dealing with covenants not to compete in pension plans, see Rochester v. Rochester
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.
1971). Covenants in partnerships are within the scope of this article since courts evaluate
them in the same manner as covenants in employer-employee contracts. See generally
Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909); Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296,
199 N.W. 10 (1924); Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980); Meissel v. Finley,
198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
2. "Since the restraint sought to be imposed restricts the employee in the exercise of a
gainful occupation, it is a restraint in trade .. " Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790,
795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). See also Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 A.
542 (1928).
3. "Freedom to contract must not be unreasonably abridged. Neither must the right to
protect by reasonable restrictions that which a man by industry, skill, and good judgment
has built up be denied." Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 928, 62 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1951) (citing
Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, -, 199 N.W. 10, 12 (1924)). See notes 70-127 infra and
accompanying text.
4. Injunctive relief will be granted where the employer proves that nonenforcement of the
covenant will result in irreparable harm to or substantial interference with his business.
Smithereen Co. v. Renfroe, 325 Ill. App. 229, 59 N.E.2d 545 (1945); Stoneman v. Wilson, 169
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A comprehensive survey of the cases involving employee covenants not
to compete reveals that the particular facts and circumstances in each
case govern whether the covenant will be enforceable. "Precedents are of
little value, because the question of reasonableness must be decided on an
ad hoc basis."5 As Judge Hoover observed:
[An employee's covenant not to compete] is not one of those questions on
which the legal researcher cannot find enough to quench his thirst. To the
contrary there is so much authority it drowns him. It is a sea-vast and
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of
strange support for anything, if he lives so long.6
It is into this "sea" that we launch in an effort to develop some general
guidelines for the draftsman to consider in his quest to create a reasona-
ble covenant suited to the needs of his client. While it is difficult to pre-
dict whether a court will enforce a particular covenant, a knowledge of
case law is beneficial before that quest begins. Emphasis will be on Vir-
ginia case law' but not to the exclusion of important decisions in other
jurisdictions, especially since Virginia apparently follows the national
trend.
In addition to exploring the issues raised by courts in their investiga-
tion of the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete, this note will
also analyze the various positions taken on the modification of these cove-
nants and will discuss the conflict of laws problems which arise under
Va. 239, 192 S.E. 816 (1937); Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415
(1959). However, an injunction should not issue where it would "operate oppressively or
contrary to the real justice of the case, or where it is not the fit and appropriate method of
redress under all the circumstances of the case, or when the benefit it will do the complain-
ant is slight in comparison with the injury it will do the defendant." Sternberg v. O'Brien,
48 N.J. Eq. 370, -, 22 A. 348, 350 (1891).
5. 54 Am. JUR. 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 543
(1971).
6. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, -, 105 N.E.2d
685, 687 (Ohio 1952).
7. Maryland Undercoating Co. v. Payne, 603 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1979); Alston Studios, Inc.
v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974); National Homes Corp. v. Lester
Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.); af'd in part, rev'd in part, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir.
1968); Davis-Robertson Agency v. Duke, 119 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Va. 1953); Foti v. Cook, 220
V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980); Linville v. Servisoft of Va., Inc., 211 Va. 53, 174 S.E.2d
785 (1970); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Meissel v. Finley,
198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951); Klaff v.
Pratt, 117 Va. 739, 86 S.E. 74 (1915). See Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387
(4th Cir. 1971), vacating in part Sperry Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 1209 (E.D. Va. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va.
239, 192 S.E. 816 (1937). See generally 12B MICHIES JURISPRUDENCE Master and Servant § 6
(1978).
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certain circumstances.
II. REASONABLENESS OF THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE
A. Background
The covenant not to compete in employment contracts is primarily
"business stability insurance" for the employer." Generally, a former em-
ployee after termination of his employment, may compete with his former
employer;9 however, a contract containing a restrictive covenant restrains
the employee from making "use of weapons placed by [his employer]...
in his... hands during his service... which may be turned against" his
former employer for the purposes of unfair competition. 10 To protect
himself from unfair competition, the employer often includes a covenant
in the employment contract stating that upon leaving his employ the em-
ployee will not compete with him either within a particular area or with
certain customers for a certain period of time. By means of an enforceable
covenant the employer not only protects himself from competition by an
ex-employee but also protects himself against unfair competition from a
rival firm trying to hire his employees."
B. Consideration
1. Introduction
In order for there to be an enforceable covenant not to compete, and
before the court even gets to the issue of the covenant's reasonableness,
there must be adequate consideration to support the restraint in the con-
tract. It has long been the rule at common law, that contracts in restraint
of trade made independently of a sale of business or a contract of employ-
ment are void as against public policy, regardless of the value of the con-
sideration.'2 While covenants not to compete that are ancillary to employ-
8. Note, Covenant Not to Compete-Enforceability Under Missouri Law, 41 Mo. L. REv.
37, 41 (1976).
9. Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1963). See 12B
MICHIES JURISPRUDENCE Master and Servant § 6 (1978). Note that even under the general
rule, the employee even without a covenant to compete in his contract is prohibited from
using confidential information or trade secrets obtained from his former employer. 317 F.2d
at 244. This also applies in some jurisdictions to confidential customer lists unless the list
may be readily discoverable by other means. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543
(1944).
10. May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, -, 2 A.2d 385, 388 (1938). Accord Thomas W. Briggs Co.
v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295 (1926).
11. Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928).
12. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S.
108 [Vol. 15:105
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
ment contracts may be enforced if reasonable, they are "no different from
other promises in requiring a consideration for enforceability."'13
Generally courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration
when determining the validity of a covenant not to compete. Hence, in
order to determine whether a remedy is available "at law" the courts
must merely determine whether the restraint is reasonable and consistent
with the law and whether there is legal consideration to support the con-
tract."4 Therefore, in actions for damages for breach of contract, a recita-
tion of consideration or a seal may be sufficient to support such con-
tracts.15 This discussion of consideration, however, will be concerned
exclusively with the enforcement of restrictive covenants in equity as this
is the area in which the great bulk of the litigation is found. Here the
courts look past mere recitations of consideration in an attempt to ex-
amine the extent and character of the consideration received by the
promisor, as this is one of the factors that equity courts use to determine
whether covenants not to compete are reasonable and, hence,
enforceable.16
2. Contracts Which Directly Affect the Employee's Status
To date no cases have been decided in Virginia with regard to the ex-
tent of consideration necessary to enforce a covenant not to compete con-
tained in an employment contract. In the normal case, where a prospec-
tive employee enters into an employment contract containing a covenant
not to compete before commencing employment, consideration is not an
issue in the determination of the reasonableness of the restriction. In
these cases, the contracts are never found devoid of consideration because
the employer's agreement to hire the employee is sufficient consideration
to support the employee's promise not to compete upon termination of
the employment. 7 This principle was enunciated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court" when the court stated that where "the restrictive cove-
nant is ancillary to a contract establishing an employment relationship,
where none existed previously thereto, the employment constitutes con-
211 (1899); Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967); RESTATE-
MENT OF CoNTRACTS § 515(e) (1932).
13. 6 A. CORBIN, CONrRACTS § 1395 (1962).
14. 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 513
(1971).
15. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 252 (1963).
16. 6 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 1395 (1962).
17. See, e.g., Rider v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 224 Ga. 145, 160 S.E.2d 381 (1968); Wil-
mar, Inc. v. Corsillo, 24 N.C. App. 271, 210 S.E.2d 427 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 421,
211 S.E.2d 802 (1975).
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sideration supporting that covenant.""' Virginia and federal courts apply-
ing Virginia law have had no problem enforcing such covenants which are
ancillary to an initial employment contract where the terms of the cove-
nant are not otherwise unreasonable.19
Similarly, the courts have consistently enforced restrictive covenants
entered into by an employee, already employed under a pre-existing em-
ployment contract, where the employee receives new consideration when
he enters into an employment contract containing a restrictive covenant.
This new consideration may be in the form of any substantial change in
the employee's status, whether it is a change in position or duties, 0 an
increase in salary, 2' a change in the manner of compensation, 2 the receipt
of a definite term of employment,2 3 or the provision for an annuity upon
retirement,24 as long as the change in the status of the employee can be
attributed directly to the employment contract containing the restrictive
covenant. The Virginia Supreme Court appears to have at least impliedly
accepted a change in the method of compensation for an employee from
straight salary to commission as being sufficient consideration to support
18. Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, -, 206 A.2d 59, 61 (1965).
19. See, e.g., National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.),
aff'd, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
20. See, e.g., Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 220 S.E.2d 190
(1975) (the court held that a promotion from acting general manager to general manager
coupled with a two-year employment contract was sufficient consideration to support a cov-
enant not to compete contained in the employment contract). See also Standard Register
Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961) (it was held that a change in position
and duties of an employee from clerical work to sales provided the necessary consideration).
21. See, e.g., Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley, 262 Or. 143, 497 P.2d 364 (1972). The
Oregon Supreme Court held that where a salesman received a guaranteed salary above that
which he had previously received, there was consideration to support the underlying cove-
nant not to compete.
22. See, e.g., M.S. Jacobs & Assoc., Inc. v. Duffley, 452 Pa. 143, 303 A.2d 921 (1973) (the
court found consideration in fact that defendant employee was made a salesman and put on
commission plus expenses basis of remuneration); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environ-
ment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967) (employee received a reduction in salary and a
profit sharing arrangement which resulted in an increase in compensation). It should be
noted that, in both cases, the change in the method of compensation resulted in an in-
creased compensation to the employee. It is unlikely that a change in the method of com-
pensation which works to the detriment of the employee would be considered to be suffi-
cient consideration to support a covenant not to compete.
23. See, e.g., Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 220 S.E.2d 190
(1975) (two-year contract of employment was sufficient consideration).
24. See, e.g., Stover v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co., 164 A.D. 155, 149 N.Y.S. 650 (1914)
(the court held that an agreement to pay employee an annuity for ten years after retirement
supported a covenant not to compete).
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a covenant not to compete.2 5
It should be remembered, however, that courts of equity will look to
the extent and character of the consideration and, hence, nominal mone-
tary consideration will not support a covenant not to compete, 2 nor gen-
erally will the fact that the new employment contract requires notice of
termination support such a covenant.27
3. Contracts Which Do Not Affect Employee's Status
Contracts which include covenants not to compete which are entered
into between an employer and an employee after the inception of employ-
ment have been a source of confusion for the courts, especially where the
employee has not received a corresponding change in status for entering
into such an agreement. A problem arises as it appears that the employer
receives the employee's promise not to compete while giving the employee
nothing in exchange. While there is little question that these agreements
are not enforceable at their inception,28 there is a split of authority as to
whether performance under such a contract imports the consideration
necessary to support it.29
Virginia has never adjudicated this question, but there are. decisions
which appear to give some indication as to the course which the courts
would take if the question were presented. The Virginia Supreme Court
has held that a promise which is void for lack of mutuality and considera-
25. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962). In this case an em-
ployee signed a contract containing a covenant not to compete three years after being em-
ployed by the company. The employment contract did change the employee's method of
compensation from a salary to a commission basis and provided for a thirty-day notice of
termination, but it did not otherwise change defendant's duties or remuneration. While the
court held the covenant unenforceable as its terms were unduly harsh on the employee, it
was never hinted that the covenant may fail for lack of consideration.
26. See, e.g., Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); George W. Kistler, Inc. v.
O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975). In neither case did the court consider the possi-
bility that the recited consideration of one dollar and continued employment would import
the consideration necessary to support the contract.
27. See, e.g., Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967) (thirty-
day notice in the event of termination did not supply the consideration necessary to support
the contract); Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 66 A.2d 218 (1949) (one-
week notice prior to termination was not sufficient consideration). But see Chandler, Gard-
ner & Williams, Inc. v. Reynolds, 250 Mass. 309, 145 N.E. 476 (1924) (the contract reserved
a power in the employer to terminate the employment for good cause and the court found
consideration by reading into the contract a requirement that the employer exercise honest
judgment).
28. See Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934).
29. See notes 37-67 infra and accompanying text.
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tion at its inception may secure the necessary consideration to make the
contract enforceable if the parties perform under the contract.30 The
court clearly enunciated its position when it stated:
[W]here one makes a promise conditioned upon the doing of an act by an-
other, and the latter does the act, the contract is not void for want of mutu-
ality, and the promisor is liable though the promisee did not at the time of
the promise engage to do the act; for upon the performance of the condition
by the promisee, the contract becomes clothed with a valid consideration
which renders the promise obligatory.$1
While there is some authority to the contrary,3 2 it appears that the
court would be disposed to uphold a covenant not to compete entered
into after the time of the initial employment if the parties subsequently
perform pursuant to the contract; i.e., the employee remains employed by
the employer and receives the compensation normally attributable to
such a relationship. The decision in Twohy v. Harris3 must be read in
light of the fact that it was not concerned with an employee covenant not
to compete. In these cases the court will carefully examine and strictly
construe these covenants since they are in restraint of trade,34 and conse-
quently the court places the burden of proving the validity of such a con-
tract upon the employer.30 It has been noted that although continued em-
ployment would certainly be sufficient to support an ordinary contract
such conduct may not support contracts containing covenants not to
compete.3 6
The Virginia position remains unascertainable, and a survey of other
jurisdictions does little to clarify the law in this area as the courts are
divided on whether continued employment constitutes sufficient con-
sideration to support the covenants. The states of Arkansas,3 7 Ala-
bama, 8 Connecticut, 9 Florida,40 Georgia,41 Iowa,42 Kentucky,43 Miss-
30. Twohy v. Harris, 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952) (the court upheld a promise of an
employer to give an employee a ten percent interest in the corporation if the employee
agreed to remain in the employ of the corporation).
31. Id. at 81, 72 S.E.2d at 336, citing 12 AM. JUR. Contracts § 14
32. Southern Ry. v. Willcox, 98 Va. 222, 35 S.E. 355 (1900). Here the court ruled that an
agreement which is not binding at the inception is nudum pactum. This case appears to be
at best outdated, if not overruled by implication.
33. 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952).
34. Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974); Rich-
ardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
35. Linville v. Servisoft of Va., Inc., 211 Va. 53, 174 S.E.2d 785 (1970).
36. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1395 n.91 (1962).
37. See, e.g., Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906 (1966) (actual employment for
two years after signing a covenant not to compete provided the consideration to support it).
38. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 229 So. 2d 480 (1969) (continued
[Vol. 15:105
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issippi,44 Missouri,45 New Jersey,46 and Texas47 generally find considera-
tion in such an event. The courts, however, appear to proceed on a variety
of theories. Some courts hold flatly that continued employment by an em-
ployee who is under no obligation to remain, and the continuance by the
employer of the employment where continuance is not required, supplies
adequate consideration to support a secondary contract of employment
entered into after the commencement of employment.48
Other courts proceed on the theory of executed consideration.49 In
other words, a contract which is voidable for lack of mutuality because by
its terms it does not bind one of the parties becomes obligatory if the
promisee performs under such an agreement as if he were bound. As ex-
employment, the willingness of the company to continue to employ defendant in the future
and a three month term of employment provided valid consideration for signing the
contract).
39. See Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934) (continued employment for
five years was sufficient).
40. See, e.g., McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Ct. App.
1962); Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). Both courts
held that where the employment was terminable at will by the employer, continued employ-
ment and agreement to compensate the employee was consideration for the covenant not to
compete.
41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Serv., Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 108 S.E.2d 328 (1959);
Breed v. National Credit Ass'n., 211 Ga. 629, 88 S.E.2d 15 (1955).
42. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Serv. Co. of Maynard v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972)
(continued employment for one year was sufficient).
43. See Louisville Cycle & Supply Co. v. Baach, 535 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1976).
44. See, e.g., Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963)
(the court held that continued employment for four years was sufficient where evidence
showed that the employee would have been discharged had he not signed the covenant not
to compete).
45. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (court held that defendant supplied consideration by his agreement to perform ser-
vices for the plaintiff and that the plaintiff likewise had supplied consideration by his agree-
ment to employ defendant and pay him a weekly salary).
46. See Credit Rating Serv., Inc. v. Charlesworth, 126 N.J. Eq. 360, 8 A.2d 847 (1939)
(continued employment for three years was sufficient to support covenants not to compete
for three years after the termination of employment).
47. See, e.g., McAnally v. Person, 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (continued em-
ployment was sufficient consideration where it appeared that employee would have been
discharged had he not signed covenant not to compete).
48. See, e.g., Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906 (1966); Tasty Box Lunch Co. v.
Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); Farm Bureau Serv. Co. of Maynard v. Kohls,
203 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976).
49. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 229 So. 2d 480 (1969); Roessler v.
Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934); Breed v. National Credit Ass'n., 211 Ga. 629, 88
S.E.2d 15 (1955).
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plained by the Georgia court:
Performance by the parties supplied mutuality and sufficient consideration
to vitalize the ancillary agreement of the defendant into an enforceable con-
tract. . . . "Though a promise may be a nudum pactum when made because
the promisee is not bound, it becomes binding when he subsequently fur-
nishes the consideration by doing what he was expected to do." 0
Still other courts will uphold contracts on the basis of continued em-
ployment where the evidence shows that if the employee had not signed
the covenant not to compete he would have been discharged.51 The threat
of dismissal acts to terminate the original agreement, and the continued
employment is sufficient to support the subsequent agreement as such
continued employment can be explained only as a result of the subse-
quent agreement.
It must be remembered that equity courts weigh the sufficiency of the
consideration; 52 therefore, it is unlikely that any of these courts would
uphold a contract where the employee remains in the employ of the
promisee for only a short time after the secondary agreement.5 3 In every
case found where the courts upheld these agreements the employee re-
mained employed for a considerable amount of time after signing the
agreement and the employee either left on his own volition or was dis-
charged for good cause." Similarly, it should be noted that in every case
found the initial contract of employment was terminable at the will of
either party.5 5 If there is a pre-existing employment contract for a defi-
nite period of time, continued employment will not be sufficient to sup-
port a modification without some additional consideration."
On the other hand, several states, including North Carolina,57 Ohio,58
50. Breed v. National Credit Ass'n, 211 Ga. 629, -, 88 S.E.2d 15, 18 (1955) (quoting
Brown v. Bowman, 119 Ga. 153, -, 46 S.E. 410, 410 (1903)).
51. See, e.g., Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963);
McAnally v. Person, 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Bettinger v. North Fort Worth
Ice Co., 278 S.W. 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
52. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
53. Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963), where
the court noted in dictum that if the "appellant had been discharged shortly after signing
the restrictive agreement, this Court would probably hold the agreement was not supported
by consideration." Id. at -, 154 So.2d at 154.
54. See notes 37-47 supra.
55. Id.
56. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
57. See, e.g., Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 220 S.E.2d 190
(1975) (where the court held that continuance in the plaintiff's employ for eight years was
not consideration to support the contract which had bestowed no promotion or increase in
114 [Vol. 15:105
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Oregon, 59 Pennsylvania, 0 and Washington,61 hold that continued employ-
ment is not sufficient to support a covenant not to compete entered into
after the inception of the employment. The majority of these cases stipu-
late that there is no consideration at the commencement of the contract
because the employer has not bound himself to do anything that he was
not already bound to do where he does not change the employee's status
under the terms of the contract and where the employment remains ter-
minable at will. 2 Furthermore, continued employment under these con-
,tracts is not considered to furnish the consideration necessary to support
the contract or to provide the requisite mutuality because the continued
employment relates back to the original agreement and, hence, cannot be
imputed into the subsequent agreement not to compete.6 "
The most extreme position, with regard to restrictive covenants, was
taken in Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend,6 4 where the Pennsylvania
court held that restrictive covenants entered into by subsequent agree-
ment were not ancillary to the taking of employment and, hence, were
unenforceable as against public policy regardless of the value of the con-
sideration exchanged. This view, however, has been tempered considera-
bly by subsequent decisions in the same court, which now appears willing
to validate contracts entered into subsequent to the taking of employ-
salary upon the defendant at its inception); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543
(1944).
58. See, e.g., Morgan Lumber Sales Co. v. Toth, 41 Ohio Misc. 17, 321 N.E.2d 907 (1974).
The court refused to find consideration on the ground that Ohio law requires covenants not
to compete to be strictly construed as they are normally written by the employer and are in
restraint of trade.
59. See McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960) The court found no
consideration because there was no express promise of continued employment, nor could
one be implied, where the employer did not require the employee to sign as a condition of
employment.
60. See, e.g., George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975) (court
said that continued employment would clearly be past consideration and that such "contracts
must be supported by new consideration); Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa.
327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974) (covenant not to compete entered into one year after inception of
employment requires new consideration); Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66
A.2d 218 (1949) (one-week notice of termination is not sufficient consideration to support a
contract which includes a covenant not to compete).
61. See, e.g., Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273 (1934) (contract was void for
lack of mutuality where employment could be terminated at will of the employer).
62. See, e.g., Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974);
Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d 218 (1949); Schneller v. Hayes, 176
Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273 (1934).
63. George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975).
64. 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967).
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ment as long as the contract is supported by a new consideration. 5
While at least one court has held that signing a covenant under the
threat of discharge not only fails to impute the necessary consideration,
but also borders upon duress, 66 other courts have implied that if it were
determined that the signing of such an agreement was a condition of em-
ployment, then they would have found the consideration to support the
agreement.67
In light of the conflicting authority, it is obvious that the Virginia Su-
preme Court could rule either way were it presented with the question of
whether continued employment is sufficient consideration to support the
enforcement of a contract in equity. It is likely, therefore, that the court's
ruling would focus on the facts of the case presented. If the continued
employment is extended and the terms of the covenant otherwise reason-
able, it is likely that the court would adhere to its holding in Twohy v.
Harris5 and find that performance under a contract will supply the con-
sideration and mutuality necessary to allow it to be enforced. If, on the
other hand, the court is unable to imply a promise of continued employ-
ment on the part of the employer from extended employment and there is
no threat of discharge for failure to sign the contract, it would appear
that the court would be inclined to find no consideration because of the
strict scrutiny accorded such restrictive covenants.6 9 In either case, it is
important that the court remain flexible in its ruling in order to be able
to reach an equitable result should the facts swing to the other end of the
spectrum.
4. Conclusion
Consideration is not generally an issue raised when determining
whether to enforce a covenant not to compete against a former employer.
It is universally accepted that restrictive covenants entered into at the
inception of employment are supported by the consideration of the em-
65. See, e.g., George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975); Main-
tenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974).
66. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944). The court stated:
A consideration cannot be constituted out of something that is given and taken in the
same breath-of an employment which need not last longer than the ink is dry upon
the signature of the employee, and where the performance of the promise is under a
definite threat of discharge. Unemployment at a future time is disturbing-its imme-
diacy is formidable.
Id. at -, 29 S.E.2d at 548.
67. See, e.g., McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960).
68. 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952).
69. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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ployment itself. Additionally, courts consistently enforce covenants en-
tered into after the inception of employment if the employer rewards the
employee with any significant compensation for entering into the cove-
nant, whether it be in the form of a change in status, increase in salary or
any other benefit. The most difficult situation occurs when the employee
receives no change in status but remains in the employ of the promisee.
Here the jurisdictions are split, and it appears that the Virginia Supreme
Court could rule either way with equal justification. It is likely, therefore,
that the court will be swayed by the facts involved in the particular case.
It should be noted that the great majority of the jurisdictions ruling on
this issue have remained receptive to arguments against their general po-
sition and have so ruled when equity dictates. Accordingly, regardless of
the position initially adopted by the Virginia courts, it is likely that they
would adopt an alternative approach should the facts warrant it.
C. Rule of Reasonableness
1. Introduction
In determining whether a restraint against trade in the form of a cove-
nant not to compete in an employment contract is enforceable, the courts
in Virginia, as in other jurisdictions, resort to the three-pronged reasona-
bleness test.70 The test examines the covenant not to compete to deter-
mine if it is reasonable with respect to the employer, the employee and
the public in general.7 1 The court, implementing this test, is required to
delicately weigh and balance the interests of each of these interested par-
ties.7 2 It is the reasonableness of the covenant when viewed in light of all
these interests that will determine its enforceability. An enforceable cove-
nant, therefore, will be one which survives this balancing act by being: 1)
no greater than necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate
business interest, 2) not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the
legitimate efforts of the employee to earn a livelihood, and 3) reasonable
under the numerous public policies and considerations.73
70. See Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
71. Id.
72. "In determining what is reasonable the Goddess of Justice that hovers over the Amer-
ican court house with scale in hand has a delicate job of weighing; and it is a three-not a
two-pan scale for she must balance the conflicting interests of employer, employee, and
public." Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685, 692 (Ohio 1952).
73. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
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2. Reasonableness as to Employer
"Reasonableness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder."7 4 This
statement is well supported by a reading of court decisions pertaining to
the validity of the covenants not to compete. It is apparent that the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of each case determine the outcome.75
Under the first prong of the tripartite test, the court looks to reasona-
bleness of the covenant from the employer's perspective. In its review the
court first determines if the employer has a legitimate interest capable of
protection and in need thereof.78 Whether such a legitimate interest exists
depends in large part on 1) the nature of the employer's business and 2)
the function of the employee within this business operation.7 7 The em-
ployer must "show special circumstances which make it unfair for him to
bear all the risk of placing the employee in a position in which a later
breach of confidence might be costly. 1' 8 The employer, by means of a
covenant, cannot protect himself against ordinary competition from the
employee after termination of his employment.7 9 Therefore, any ordinary
skill and experience obtained by the employee during his employment
does not, by itself, constitute a protectible interest.80 No legal wrong can
74. Comment, Covenants Not to Compete-Enforceability Under Missouri Law, 41 Mo.
L. REv. 37, 39 (1976).
75. "[I]n determining whether or not a contract in restraint of trade is reasonable each
case must be considered in the light of its own facts and circumstances ... in so far as they
do not add to, vary, or otherwise alter the writing sued on .. " Merriman v. Cover, Dray-
ton & Leonard, 104 Va. 428, 437, 51 S.E. 817, 819 (1905). Accord, Smithereen Co. v. Rn-
froe, 325 Ill. App. 229, 59 N.E.2d 545 (1945). See also Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263
S.E.2d 430 (1980).
76. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62
S.E.2d 876 (1951). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 151-207 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as 43 A.L.R.2d]; Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 69-130 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 41 A.L.R.2d].
77. Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va. 239, 192 S.E. 816 (1937). Accord, Briggs v. Butler, 140
Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942), where Judge Matthias stated: "The determination of the
necessity for such restrictions is dependent upon the nature and extent of the business and
the nature and extent of the service of the employee in connection therewith and other
pertinent conditions." Id. at 507, 45 N.E.2d at 761. See also Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771,
263 S.E.2d 430 (1980) where the court seems to emphasize the defendant's position as a
senior partner in the firm.
78. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 651 (1960).
79. "An employer is not entitled to be protected against legitimate and ordinary competi-
tion of the type that a stranger could give. There must be some additional special facts and
circumstances which render the restrictive covenant reasonably necessary for the protection
of the employer's business." Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, -, 98 N.W.2d 415,
419 (1959). Accord, Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954).
80. Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954); Roy v. Bolduc, 140
Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479 (1943); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Clark Paper
& Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923).
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or does occur by the use of such "know-how" by the employee.81
While not constituting a protectible interest in and of itself under most
circumstances, the experience and skill acquired has a positive influence
on the court in its determination of the reasonableness of the covenant,
especially where special methods or systems are involved. Thus, in Orkin
Exterminating Co. of Arkansas v. Murrell s2 where the employee had
gained skill in the use of the special methods and processes which the
employer had placed in his hands and which were the results of a large
number of manhours and expenditures of money, the court enforced a
covenant restricting the employee from competing with Orkin for a period
of one year.8 3 The particular experience gained, therefore, seems to effect
the duration of the covenant and helps determine whether it is
reasonable.8
a. Legitimate Interests
There are two legitimate interests 5 which courts have allowed employ-
ers to protect by means of a covenant not to compete: 1) customers under
the "customer-contact theory"8 8 and 2) trade secrets or confidential busi-
ness matters.8 7 Both of these in a sense are considered proprietary inter-
ests that the employer over time develops and expands as a result of his
efforts in business." The goodwill of his business and any trade secrets
which develop as a result of his efforts belong to the employer as a result
81. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v.
Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923).
82. 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185 (1947).
83. For other cases involring acquisition of special skill or experience coupled with the
employee's use or contact with employer's special processes (trade secrets), see Irvington
Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99,46 A.2d 201 (1946); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Powers Film Prod., Inc., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.S. 325 (1919), appeal denied, 190
App. Div. 970, 179 N.Y.S. 919 (1920). But see Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d
279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (where the court upheld covenant but not on the grounds of the
special training of the employee).
84. See generally 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 122.
85. Renwood Food Prods., Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949).
86. Jewel Paint & Varnish Co. v. Walters, 339 Ill. App. 355, 89 N.E.2d 835 (1950); Blake,
supra note 78, at 653-67. See generally 43 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 162-85; 41 A.L.R.2d,
supra note 76, at 71-102.
87. Blake, supra note 78, at 667-74. See generally 43 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 185-200;
41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 103-20.
88. Tolman Laundry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936); Renwood Food Prods.,
Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949). While being a "proprietary inter-
est," the "gravamen in a trade secrets case is a breach of confidence rather than the in-
fringement of a property right." 18 MCHIES JURISPRUDENcE Trademarks, Tradenames &
Unfair Competition § 4.1 (1974).
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of his gainful employment of a competant employee.""
i. "Customer Contact Theory"
Customers are an asset without which a person or company in the trade
of selling products or services would not exist. The company's business is
perpetuated by the goodwill 90 that is developed with customers. Creation
of this goodwill with the employer's customers is often achieved by the
employer's agent 1 in the course of the performance of his duties as an
employee. In return, the agent receives compensation for the "value of
the business which he produce[s]. ' ' 92 As a result, the "customers and pa-
tronage ... [are] for the benefit of the employer and the increased good-
will [becomes] the property of the master however much their procure-
ment was to be attributed to the servant's energy, personality, and
skill. '93 Nevertheless, the "possibility is present that the customer will
regard, or come to regard, the attributes of the employee as more impor-
tant in his business dealings than any special qualities of the product or
service of the employer, especially if the product is not greatly differenti-
ated from others which are available. '94 The employee rather than em-
ployer in such cases becomes identified with the product. This creates a
grave risk to the employer, since upon termination of employment the
employee may be able to divert the customer away from the ex-employer
by means of this influence.
Under the "customer contact theory," courts in equity have been will-
ing to allow employers to protect their interest by a reasonable covenant
when termination of employment creates such a risk of appropriation of"goodwill." 95 In determining whether an employee is in such a position,
the court will look at 1) the nature and function of the employee's posi-
tion, 2) the frequency of the contact with the customer and 3) where the
contact took place.9 6
The nature of the business in which the employee is engaged aids the
court in determining the amount of risk which the employer faces. Where
89. Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 148 S.E. 315 (1929) (citing Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn.
296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924)).
90. John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (1952) (where the court defines
goodwill).
91. Tolman Laundry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936).
92. Id. at -, 187 A. at 838.
93. Id.
94. Blake, supra note 78, at 654.
95. Jewel Paint & Varnish Co. v. Walters, 339 Ill. App. 335, 89 N.E.2d 835 (1950). See
Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980).
96. Blake, supra note 78, at 659-67.
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the product or the nature of services provided requires close dealings with
the customers the likelihood of the development of a "close relationship"
is increased. Where an employee has any "influence" over the customer in
derogation of his employer's rights as a result of this contact, the courts
will be more willing to find a legitimate interest. Thus, in Meissel v. Fin-
ley 97 where a restrictive covenant was signed by a partner in an insurance
firm, the court made note of the fact that in the course of his employ it
was inevitable that the employee would become quite familiar with the
customers. This familiarity and possible influence was a factor in the
court's determination that the covenant involved was enforceable. 9 The
means by which a business is conducted is also an important considera-
tion. This is especially true with respect to cases involving salesmen.99 In
fact, the nature in which business is conducted, and the resultant em-
ployee-customer relations, prompted one court to state that the custom-
ers "might well be said to be customers of the appellant [employee] and
not of the appellee [employer]. 10 0
Professionals especially have been subjected to the enforcement of
these covenants.101 The nature of the services they render often brings
them into a confidential personal relationship with their client-custom-
ers.102 The professional is also likely to hold a tremendous amount of con-
trol over the client as a result of his position and inherent authority. It
97. 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956). See also Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d
430 (1980).
98. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956). The court also took into consid-
eration the fact that employee had a customer list.
99. Jewel Paint & Varnish Co. v. Walters, 339 11. App. 335, 89 N.E.2d 835 (1950); Tolman
Laundry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936); Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155
Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928). See Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113
(1962) (covenant too broad to be enforced in equity). Contra, Love v. Miami Laundry Co.,
118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32 (1935) (court attributes goodwill solely to the ability of the em-
ployee). See generally 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 74-79.
100. Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, -, 141 A. 542, 545 (1928).
101. See, e.g., Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909) (concerning a doctor);
May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A.2d 385 (1938) (concerning an engineer); Granger v. Craven,
159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924) (concerning a physician); Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223,
148 S.E. 315 (1929) (concerning an accountant); Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d
430 (1980) (concerning an accountant); Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).
See also Note, Validity of Covenants Not to Compete: Common Law Rules and Illinois
Law, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 249, 263. [Hereinafter cited as 1978 U. ILL. L. F.].
Attorneys in the United States are prohibited from entering into restrictive covenants not
to compete. Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct, DR 2-108
(1978).
102. "[C]lient relationship probably accounts for the favored treatment of covenants in-
volving professionals." 1978 U. ILL. L. F., supra note 101, at 263.
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follows, then, that the position which the employee holds will also be a
factor in the courts' consideration of the gravity of the risk to the em-
ployer.10 3 The courts here look to see whether such position was a supe-
rior one, evoking the confidence of the customer in the employee, or
whether the position was simply incidental to the services or product
provided.'"
The frequency of the contact of the employee with the customer obvi-
ously is a factor which the courts must evaluate in determining the risk
which the employer faces.10 5 The duration of such contact must also be
considered. This evaluation has a direct effect in the court's determina-
tion of whether the duration of a covenant is reasonable. 106
Furthermore, the court must take into account where the contact be-
tween employee and customer occurred.10 7 This factor plays a large role
with respect to the customer's identification of the product or service of-
fered with the employee. If the contact takes place at the home of the
customer, naturally there will be a greater tendency to equate product
and employee. As a result, the courts have tended to find a protectable
interest in such cases. 0 8 Normally the covenant, if reasonable, is enforce-
able only to the area served by that particular employee. 0 9 If the contact,
however, occurs at the employee's place of business, other employees
might be linked with the product and the influence of the particular em-
ployee might be diminished. Nevertheless, the employee may still hold
great persuasive influence over the customer, either because of his posi-
103. See Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954); Renwood Food
Prods., Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949); Poti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R.
771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956). Compare
Credit Rating Service, Inc. v. Charlesworth, 126 N.J. Eq. 360, 8 A.2d 847 (1939) with Stern-
berg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22 A. 348 (1891) and Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29
S.E.2d 543 (1944).
104. Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923).
105. See Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928); Arthur Murray
Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1952); Lake-
side Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959); Blake, supra note 78, at 659-
60.
106. "When an employee's contacts with the customers are regular and frequent a shorter
period of time is needed by the employer than when ... the contacts are made at relatively
long intervals." Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, -, 98 N.W.2d 415, 420 (1959).
The courts will normally allow that period of time which it deems it will take the employer
to "obliterate in the minds of the ... [employer's] customers the identification formed dur-
ing the period of the ... [employee's] employment." Id. See generally notes 140-52 infra
and accompanying text.
107. See generally Blake, supra note 78, at 660-61; 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 73-85.
108. See the numerous route cases collected in 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 74-79.
109. See generally notes 153-68 infra and accompanying text.
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tion or the nature of the business. Courts tend to limit enforceability of
the restriction in these cases to particular customers or areas in which the
business operates."O
Case law in Virginia concerned with this "customer-contact theory" ap-
pears to uphold the employer's right to protect the goodwill of his cus-
tomers from his employee's wrongful appropriation. The courts in both
Meissel v. Finley"' and Worrie v. Boze 12 took into account the em-
ployer's contacts and familiarity with the customers in upholding the re-
strictive covenants in their respective contracts."1
ii. Confidential Business Matters and Trade Secrets.
"One who invents or discovers and keeps secret a process of manufac-
ture,.., has a property therein which the court will protect against one
who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence, undertakes to ap-
ply it to his own use or disclose it to a third person."1 14 Thus, in Irvington
Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde,115 the court upheld a restrictive
covenant not to disclose trade secrets or confidential information for 2
years anywhere in the United States, and thereby, showed the respect of
the courts for employer's proprietary rights in matters of this kind. 16
Thus, trade secrets 17 are another legitimate interest which the courts
will allow employers to protect by means of a reasonable restrictive cove-
nant. However, claiming a particular process to be a trade secret does not
110. See Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980).
111. 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
112. 191 Va. 915, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
113. Trade secrets also played an integral role in the court's determination in Meissel v.
Finley and Worrie v. Boze. For a recent Virginia decision which seems to rely primarily on
customer contact to uphold a covenant not to compete, see Foti v. Cook, 220 V.R.R. 771, 263
S.E.2d 430 (1980).
114. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, , 46 A.2d 201,
202-03 (1946) (citing Soloman v. Hertz, 40 N.J. Eq. 400, -, 2 A. 379, 380 (1886)).
115. 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (1946).
116. So important is this "proprietary interest," that even though the use of trade secrets
is not mentioned in the restrictive covenant, the court may read into the covenant such a
restriction. Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
117. Trade secrets have been defined as:
[Something] known only to the particular employer and those of his employees to
whom it is necessary to confide it in order to use it for what it is intended. It is
something known only to one or a few and kept from others. The question is not
whether it is not known to the general public. It must be a secret of the particular
employer and not a general secret of the trade.
Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, _, 105 N.E.2d 685,
709 (Ohio 1952). See Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
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control the court's determination. Thus, in both Kaumagraph Co. v.
Stampagraph Co."' and Victor Chemical Works v. liff,"9 the courts
held that processes claimed by the employers to be trade secrets were not
and, therefore, rendered restrictive covenants void. The employer bears
the burden of proving that a trade secret does indeed exist.1 20 Determina-
tion by the court that the interest claimed is a trade secret is not of itself
sufficient. The employer must then show that the employee had the op-
portunity to come into contact with the secret and could in fact use it in
competition against his previous employer.12' It is only then that the
court will look to the reasonableness of the restraint as a whole under the
three-part test. If it is then found to be reasonable the court will enforce
the covenant byan injunction and spare the employer from irreparable
damage.'22
The courts have found the following to be legitimate trade secrets: 1)
processes, systems and manufacturing data of a specialized nature, 2 2)
sales and delivery records,' 24 3) business methods which can not be pat-
ented,'1 25 4) special customer lists. 26 While this list is not exhaustive, it is
118. 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
119. 299 IM. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921).
120. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685 (Ohio 1952). Evidence of precautions taken by the employer to maintain secrecy with
respect to it is helpful to the court in deciding whether something is a trade secret. Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., Inc. 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.S. 325 (1919). See Grace v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
121. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., Inc., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.S. 325
(1919) (the court reversed and remanded the decision of the lower court in order to take
evidence as to whether there was a link between the special training the employee received
and the trade secrets claimed by the employers). But see Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34
A.2d 479 (1943) (an employee had access to a customer list considered a trade secret, but
the court did not enforce the covenant since at the time of the trial it was found that the
employee had not used the list and, thus, the employer had not been irreparably harmed).
122. See National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.), a/f'd
in part, rev'd in part, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968) (federal court applying Virginia law);
Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d
876 (1951).
123. Orkin Exterminating Co. of Arkansas v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185
(1947); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., Inc., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.S. 325
(1919); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
124. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959).
125. May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A.2d 385 (1938); Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217
Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295 (1926).
126. National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d
186 (1956); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
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an indication of the types of interests which are protected. 27
b. Correlation Between Legitimate Interest and Covenant
The next step the court must take after determining the existence of a
legitimate protectable interest is to decide whether the restrictive cove-
nant reasonably protects the interest of the employer. In other words,
there must be a "correlativity" between the legitimate interest to be pro-
tected and the extent of the protection asked for.128 The covenant will be
"valid and enforceable, if the restraint .. . [is] confined within limits
which are no larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom
the contract is made may reasonably require."" 29 The extent to which the
employee may be harmed, the area sought to be covered by the covenant
and the time period for which the covenant is to last are among the perti-
nent factors which must be analyzed. 130 The courts generally will enforce
a restraint only to the extent that it is a "fair protection to the interest of
the party in favor of whom it is given and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public."'8 '
Since a "restraint that over-protects is likely to over-impinge,"' 2 the
extent of the protection afforded must only go as far as the exposure
which the employee has had with the employer's protectable interest."'3 A
fair protection is what the court seeks to impose. In cases involving cus-
tomer contact, the courts generally will allow the employer only that
amount of time which is reasonably necessary for him to "obliterate in
the minds of. . .[his] customers the identification formed during the
period of the .. . [employee's] employment, '"1 4 and normally will limit
its application to the area in which the employee operated or to the cus-
tomers he had contact with. In cases involving trade secrets the courts are
127. For a more comprehensive list, see 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 106-14.
128. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685 (Ohio 1952). See Constangy, Employment Contract Covenants Not to Compete: En-
forceability Under North Carolina Law, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217, 231-33 (1974).
129. Tolman Laundry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, _, 187 A. 836, 838 (1936).
130. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685 (Ohio 1952); Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942). See Alston Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974); Richardson v. Paxton
Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962). See generally 43 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76; 41
A.L.R.2d, supra note 76.
131. Constangy, supra note 128, at 231. Accord, Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22
A. 348 (1891).
132. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, _ 105
N.E.2d 685, 699 (Ohio 1952).
133. Constangy, supra note 128, at 232.
134. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, -, 98 N.W.2d 415, 420 (1959).
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generally more liberal as to their upholding of wider areas and longer
time limitations."' 5
3. The Reasonableness as to Employee
a. Introduction
The second element of the test used to determine the enforceability of
an employee's covenant not to compete is whether the conditions imposed
on the former employee are unduly harsh or oppressive. 8 In order to
measure the adverse effects the courts focus on the duration137 and terri-
torial scope13 8 of the restraint. Additionally, the courts may consider the
type of activity proscribed by the employment contract.139
b. Time
Courts applying Virginia law have enforced restrictive covenants run-
ning as long as ten years. The most significant case involving Virginia law
in terms of the magnitude of the restrictions imposed on a former em-
ployee is National Homes Corp. v. Lester Industries, Inc.1 40 The federal
district court was confronted with an agreement involving a defendant
who had promised not to engage in the prefabricated housing industry
anywhere in the United States in competition with the plaintiff for ten
years. The court found that the time limitation was not unreasonable.1 41
According to the opinion, there was a large quantity of goodwill retained
by the defendant when he terminated his employment prior to creating a
new corporation. Also the length of the restraint ran no longer than the
maximum duration of the original contract of employment between the
135. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971), vacating in
part, Sperry Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Va. 1970),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (injunction granted for two years without limitation as to
area).
136. "Disproportionate hardship to the party against whom enforcement is sought has
always been regarded as a reason for refusing equitable remedies." 6A CORBIN, CONTncrs
§ 1394 (1962); "A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion or dominant social or economic justification, if it... (b) imposes undue hardship upon
the person restricted. . . ." RESTATEMNT OF CoNTRAcrs § 515 (1932). See generally notes
70-73 supra and accompanying text.
137. For a general discussion of the "time" factor, see 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76.
138. For a general discussion of the "area" factor, see 43 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76.
139. "The 'activity' dimension was not an issue in the earliest cases.... But division of
labor and specialization now make it of the utmost importance that a restraint define care-
fully the activities in which the employee is not to engage." Blake, supra note 78, at 675.
140. 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968).
141. Id. at 1032.
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parties. 142 In granting an injunction the court seemed to be influenced by
the fact that the defendant was capable of earning a living in fields other
than prefabricated housing.
A five-year proscription on competition was upheld by the court in
Meissel v. Finley.14 3 A limited partner had agreed that, upon dissolution
of an insurance partnership, he would not write insurance or surety bonds
within fifty miles of the City of Norfolk for five years. He then brought a
declaratory judgment action to determine the covenant's validity. The
court held that the duration was permissible because it was tied directly
to a major aspect of the business, i.e., the volume of activity "represented
by policies that would come up for renewal in either three or five
years. '144 As the plaintiff had been responsible for these accounts, the
court observed that his access to certain information could be used to the
general partner's disadvantage.
In Worrie v. Boze, 4 5 the operators of an Arthur Murray dance studio
sought to enjoin a former employee from violating an agreement prohibit-
ing him from giving lessons to anyone within a twenty-five mile radius of
the plaintiff's Richmond-based school for two years. The court noted that
the features under such contracts must be "limited to a reasonable dura-
tion.'14 6 In light of the circumstances of the case, the court upheld the
granting of an injunction by the lower court.147
Courts in other jurisdictions have enforced restrictive covenants run-
ning for five years and more."4 8 Frequently, the covenantor is a profes-
142. The covenant was to run concurrently with the defendant's employment under the
original agreement. The restraint did not become operative until the defendant and his for-
mer employer mutually terminated the contract. There were less than four and one-half
years remaining on the restriction when this severance transpired. Id.
143. 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
144. Id. at 583, 95 S.E.2d at 190.
145. 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
146. Id. at 927, 62 S.E.2d at 881.
147. Contra, Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105
N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1952) (court denied an injunction in a dispute over an almost identically-
worded covenant).
For another Virginia case wherein a two-year restraint was upheld, see Foti v. Cook, 220
V.R.R. 771, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980) (partner agreed not to perform accounting services for
clients of the firm for whom he worked upon voluntary withdrawal from the partnership).
148. See, e.g., Lareau v. O'Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1962) (doctor promised he would not
practice within a locality for five years); GrifFin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 192 A. 359 (1937)
(barber consented to never engage in the business within a town's corporate limits); Wel-
come Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961) (hostess promised to
refrain from participating in a similar business for five years in the city wherein she was
employed as well as other areas); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 146
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sional who is seen by the courts as one who acquires special knowledge of
his former employer's practice. Moreover, the courts surmise that the
professional is in a strong position to secure gainful employment
elsewhere. 149
There is no case applying Virginia law invalidating an employee cove-
nant on the grounds that the duration is unreasonable.150 However, there
is persuasive authority for striking restrictive agreements extending for
one year or less.151 Other jurisdictions which have so held rely on the "ec-
onomic hardship" theory. Under this rationale, the courts look to whether
the employee will be deprived of the opportunity of supporting himself
and his family, whether he will have to give up the work for which he is
best trained, and whether he will be confronted with trying to find em-
ployment during an unhealthy state of the economy. However, Professor
Blake warns that "[a]lthough such facts may occasionally be appealing, it
should be kept in mind that invalidating an otherwise reasonable re-
straint on such grounds may jeopardize a conscientiously developed pro-
gram which redounds to the benefit, generally, of employer and
employee. '15 2
While duration is only one of several factors to which a court refers
when determining the reasonableness of a covenant, as a general rule, a
covenant containing a narrowly drawn time restriction will be upheld by
the courts. Conversely, time constraints which are more favorable to the
employer may be struck due to their oppressive nature. Therefore, the
draftsman should refrain from practicing "brinksmanship," i.e., attempt-
ing to approximate the outermost boundary of acceptability.
N.E.2d 447 (1957) (engineer agreed not to compete with his former employer in nineteen
states for a period of five years); Krueger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic v. Lewis, 266
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd, 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798 (1954) (orthopedic
surgeon stipulated he would never practice medicine in a particular county).
149. See notes 101-04 supra and accompanying text.
150. Generally, duration standing alone is not sufficient to render such an agreement au-
tomatically unenforceable. Most of the cases hold that this rule applies even where there is
an unlimited duration. See 41 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 33.
151. See, e.g., Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954) (delin-
quent account collector of a personal loan business agreed not to engage in similar work for
one year in any locality in which he had served his employer); Crowell v. Woodruff, 245
S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1951) (employee was prohibited from engaging in the dry cleaning business
in competition with his employer for one year); Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn.
483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932) (employee was barred from selling gasoline furnished by any sup-
plier other than the complainant for one year); Iron City Laundry Co. v. Leyton, 55 Pa.
Super. 93 (1913) (laundry route man was not to participate in a similar business for ninety
days).
152. Blake, supra note 78, at 686.
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c. Area
Under the law of Virginia restrictive covenants covering an area as
large as the United States are enforceable. In National Homes Corp. v.
Lester Industries, Inc.,153 the court ruled that the employee was not pre-
cluded from entering the prefabricated housing field within this country
as long as he did not compete with the plaintiff-former employer. More-
over, the opinion indicates that the covenantor was at liberty to engage in
such activity outside of the United States. According to the majority,
"[t]he area is not too vast when viewed from the facts peculiar to this
case ... "I"
The appellate court upheld the decision, concluding that even an agree-
ment encompassing such broad constraints is valid under Virginia law.1 5
The Fourth Circuit actually enlarged the restricted area to include a por-
tion of the Commonwealth not found to be a competitive market of the
former employer in the court below.
Meissel v. Finley"" holds that under certain circumstances an area de-
fined in terms of a fifty mile radius of the City of Norfolk may be in-
cluded in an enforceable restrictive covenant. In preventing an insurance
executive from competing in this territory, the Virginia Supreme Court
found that the area in question was virtually co-extensive with the former
employer's market.1 57
Other states have upheld agreements not to compete even though they
contained territorial boundaries which, at first blush, seem unreasona-
ble.158 Usually the courts base their holdings on the overriding need to
153. 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va.), afl'd, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968). See text accompa-
nying notes 143-44 supra for factual setting.
154. 293 F. Supp. at 1031-32. The employee had been highly successful in this business
and had sold his company to the plaintiff prior to becoming a member of plaintiff's board of
directors. The agreement was not ancillary to the sale, however.
155. National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968).
156. 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956). See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra for
factual setting.
157. 198 Va. at 582-83, 95 S.E.2d at 190. In Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876
(1951), the court enforced a covenant with a territorial scope of a twenty-five mile radius
from the employer's Richmond-based studio.
158. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966) (employee who had learned trade secrets promised to refrain
from competing with a manufacturer of padded interior parts for automobiles anywhere in
the United States for two years); Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1973) (applying Indiana law) (insurance salesman agreed to refrain from competing
for five years; although the area was without a boundary, the court noted that the com-
pany's business was highly specialized and the company's market extended nationwide);
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protect the employer's legitimate business interests."5 9
Two federal courts applying Virginia law have invalidated employee
covenants upon finding no express geographical limitation. 60 Davis-Rob-
ertson Agency v. Duke"' involved an advertising firm which attempted to
enjoin former employees from operating another agency in defiance of a
covenant prohibiting such conduct for two years. The court denied relief,
citing the agreement's silence with respect to area as the fatal flaw. Ac-
cording to the opinion, enforcement of the covenant would mean that
upon leaving plaintiff's employ, the former workers could not practice
their trade anywhere in the world. 6 2 This proscription would result in
undue hardship.
In Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Associates'6 s the agreement
prevented the employee from continuing in the business of photographing
school children for two years. There was a conspicuous absence of any
defined area. Viewed in light of the fact that the former employer could
effectively bar the defendant from engaging in any aspect of the busi-
ness" in any part of the world, the majority concluded that the covenant
created unreasonable hardship for the employee.
Though the draftsman may feel secure in defining the territorial scope
of a restrictive covenant narrowly, several jurisdictions have declined to
enforce seemingly reasonable agreements. 165 As in the case of relatively
Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961) (employee serv-
ing as both general manager and sales manager of two corporations manufacturing and dis-
tributing trimming fabrics covenanted not to compete in selling certain plastic goods for
three years in a twenty-eight state area; the court found that the employer's markets actu-
ally extended to all but two of these states and that the employee exercised complete con-
trol over their competitive position); Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138
N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (1946) (plant engineer with knowledge of certain confidential infor-
mation promised that he would not compete with a manufacturer of varnishes and insula-
tion anywhere in this country for two years); Touimin v. Becker, 69 Abs. 109, 124 N.E.2d
778 (1954) (patent solicitor consented to an agreement whereby he would not engage in the
practice of patent law or patent solicitation in either Michigan or Ohio for five years).
159. See notes 85-127 supra and accompanying text.
160. The overwhelming majority of the cases, and particularly those decided in recent
years, support the proposition that the mere fact that a covenant not to compete contains
no limit in area or is expressly made unlimited does not, standing alone, render the cove-
nant ipso facto unenforceable. See 43 A.L.R.2d, supra note 76, at 130.
161. 119 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Va. 1953).
162. Id. at 935-36.
163. 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974).
164. The Fourth Circuit was also critical of the covenant because it precluded activities in
which the worker did not participate while in the plaintiff's employ. Id. See notes 69-76
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of limitation of an employee's activities.
165. Tawney v. Mutual Sys. of Md., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946) (covenant
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brief durational constraints,1 the courts hesitate to grant relief to the
employer when the employee will be deprived of an opportunity to earn a
living. This appears to be particularly true during a depressed economy.
To reduce the likelihood of a successful challenge to the enforceability
of a restrictive covenant, the practitioner should be careful to tailor the
restricted area so as to afford no more protection to the employer than
necessary. In particular, the draftsman in Virginia should avoid relying
upon an indefinite or limitless boundary.16 7
d. Activity
One of the key considerations in determining whether the restriction is
overbroad is the position the worker held while in the employ of the cove-
nantee.168 The scope of the restrictive covenant may be no greater than
the area of activity in which the covenantor engaged.169 A Virginia case,
Richardson v. Paxton Co.,17 0 clearly illustrates this point. Here the em-
ployee, a former salesman, promised not to engage in any branch of activ-
ities relating to any kind of marine or industrial supplies, equipment, or
services in a four-state area (including Virginia) for three years. Upon
termination of his employment, the defendant began working as a sales
representative for one of his former employer's suppliers. The court de-
termined that if the covenant was enforced, not only would the employee
be prohibited from working as a salesman, but he would also be precluded
from participating in any activity in the fields outlined in the agree-
ment. 71 It was felt that this afforded the employer greater protection
prevented a bank manager and a cashier from engaging in services similar to those offered
by their employer in the Baltimore trading area for two years); Lantieri Beauty Salon, Inc.
v. Yale, 169 Misc. 547, 7 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1938) (manicurist agreed to refrain from competing
with her employer for a certain period of time within twenty blocks of the covenantee's
establishment); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) (deliveryman-bill collector
agreed not to compete in the retail clothing market for two yeafs in a particular county and
contiguous counties; the court previously determined that the restrictive covenant must fail
for want of consideration because it was executed subsequent to obtaining employment
without a change in the employee's position-see notes 28-69 supra and accompanying
text); Byers v. Trans-Pecos Abstract Co., 18 S.W.2d 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (abstractor
was precluded from competing within a particular county for two years; covenant was not
enforced where the employer failed to prove actual injury).
166. See text following note 152 supra.
167. Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974); Davis-
Robertson Agency v. Duke, 119 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Va. 1953).
168. Blake, supra note 78, at 675-76.
169. Id. at 680.
170. 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
171. Id. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117.
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than necessary, and thus worked undue hardship on the covenantor. A
similar result was reached in Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress &
Associates.11 2
As a general rule the employer should confine the proscription concern-
ing activities to only those aspects of the business in which the former
employee engages while working for the covenantee. Specificity in the
drafting of restricted activities is particularly vital when the employee
holds what would normally be considered a lower-level position. 7s
Closely related to the question of proscribed activities is the worker's
status upon entering and leaving the employment relationship with the
covenantee. The courts are inclined to look more favorably upon a re-
straint when the individual acquires new skills during the course of his
work. In Freudenthal v. Espey,74 a Colorado court underscored this posi-
tion when it examined the situation wherein a professional hires an assis-
tant with the understanding that in return for valuable experience in the
field, the employee will not solicit his employer's patients or clients at a
later time. However, if the employee brings with him a wealth of knowl-
edge, the courts place a heavy burden on the employer to demonstrate
that his legitimate interests would be adversely affected were the cove-
nant to be declared unenforceable.' 5
e. Conclusion
As mentioned before, there are no specific rules which, if followed, will
guarantee that the courts in Virginia or elsewhere will enforce a restric-
tive covenant. Variables such as time, area, and activity, when viewed to-
gether, are but a part of the analysis to determine whether the agreement
is fair to both parties. The practitioner should observe the general guide-
lines set forth herein, however, when drafting such an agreement.
172. 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974). See also, Maryland Undercoating Co. v. Payne, 603
F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1979) (court refused to enjoin a former employee of a company engaged in
processing motor vehicles for importers, distributors, and dealers when the employee went
to work for Ford Motor Company, a former customer, upon Ford's decision to service its
own imports; the court determined that Ford was not a competitor of the employer in that
Ford serviced no other automobiles and that the covenant only concerned working in com-
petition with the covenantee).
173. Most cases on point seem to share the common belief that as an employee rises
higher in the organization he acquires greater inside knowledge which in turn justifies a
broader constraint on subsequent activity. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co.,
344 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Novelty Bias Binding Co. v.
Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961).
174. 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
175. Blake, supra note 78, at 684.
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Since this area of the law is not well-settled, it is probably in the em-
ployer's best long-term interests to shield the restrictive covenant from
the critical eyes of the courts. This result can be achieved through exer-
cising self-restraint. If the employer is not overly demanding and views
the restrictions from the worker's vantage point, he is more likely to exe-
cute an agreement which will be honored by the covenantor, or readily
upheld by the courts in the event of breach.
4. Reasonableness and Public Policy
As a third criterion in determining the reasonableness and enforceabil-
ity of the covenant, courts look at the covenant's relationship to the inter-
ests of the public.176 If the covenant is too broad in its limitations it may
interfere with these interests. This is an integral and indispensable part
of the court's evaluation since the concerns of the public surround the
covenant from the day the parties contract for it, primarily due to the
underlying philosophy of the covenant and its nature.
The foundation and raison d'etre for restrictive covenants is the policy
of freedom to contract.17 7 The public has a tremendous interest in the
protection of this freedom, namely the orderly conduct of affairs in the
business, industrial, and financial world.17 8 It falls on the court to protect
this interest whenever the situation so merits. Diametrically opposed to
the freedom of contract, in this context, is the freedom of trade. Courts
place great stock in the virtues of competition and advancement through
hard work.179 In fact, "the right. . to use one's skill, talents, or experi-
ence for one's own benefit is a natural and inherent right of the individ-
ual.... ."180 Therefore any abridgement of this right tends to violate pub-
lic policy. Courts as a result must balance both of these "inherent" rights,
and hence, they weigh very carefully the interests of the employee in be-
ing free from restraint and the right of both the employee and the em-
176. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
177. Freedom of contract is a "well recognized principle ... which in its essence is...
natural and inherent in the individual, and which in innumerable cases the courts have
recognized and enforced." Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, __, 141 A. 542, 544
(1928).
178. Id. Accord, Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924); Worrie v. Boze,
191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
179. "It has long been recognized by courts and economists that it is just as essential that
men's services be freely for sale as that property should not be allowed to be withdrawn
from the market for an indefinite length of time." Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md.
280, _ 141 A. 542, 544 (1928).
180. Id. at _, 141 A. at 543.
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ployer to enter freely into a contract. 181
Aside from these underlying policy concerns, the court must also look
at several practical considerations, including the direct effect that the
covenant might have on the public if enforced. Normally, the deprivation
of the employee's services by means of a restrictive covenant is consid-
ered to be expected by the public. 8 2 Courts, in enforcing covenants not to
compete, generally presume that the service rendered by the party
breaching the covenant can adequately be performed by someone else.'
However, where the services of the employee are unique or where there is
a shortage of such services, the courts, by inference from the cases, might
not enforce a restrictive covenant.'8 ' Likewise, where the enforcement of
a covenant would tend to create or promote a monopoly, the court would
likely find it to be unreasonable 85
Secondly, by depriving the employee of his livelihood within a given
area for a certain amount of time, the court also runs the risk of the em-
ployee and his family becoming public charges. If such a possibility exists,
it would more than likely render the covenant unreasonable. In Love v.
Miami Laundry Co.,158 the court, in invalidating the covenant, reasoned
that "enforcement of the provision of the contract may, and in all
probability will mean that the contracting employee cannot procure other
employment and that he, together with his family, will become a charge
on the public.'18 7
Finally, the court must remember that such covenants provide positive
aspects in light of other public interests; specifically the protection of an
established trade or profession.'" If such covenants are allowed, the em-
ployer, because he is assured of some protection as a result of a covenant
not to compete, will be more likely to create new positions resulting in an
increase in the number of people employed. Additionally, assurance of
protection will tend to promote the free dissemination of ideas and
knowledge between the employer and employee, leading to improvements
181. The restrictive covenants are "carefully scrutinized, looked upon with disfavor,
strictly interpreted, and reluctantly upheld." Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland,
Inc. v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, -, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio 1952).
182. Blake, supra note 78, at 686-87.
183. Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).
184. See id.; Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959).
185. See Klaff v. Pratt, 117 Va. 737, 86 S.E. 74 (1915); Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis.
2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959).
186. 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32 (1935).
187. Id. at -, 160 So. at 334.
188. Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916,
62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
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and changes which might not have resulted otherwise.' 5 '
It is important to re-emphasize that public policy considerations are
not analyzed by the court separately and distinct from the other interests
involved. Restrictive covenants by their nature revolve around public pol-
icy concerns which affect the employer, employee, and the public at large.
In fact, Professor Blake suggests that the courts never reach this third
step of the test since the balancing process "engaged in [between em-
ployer and employee] will almost always result in maximizing the social
values as well as ... [the interests] of the parties."190 Whether or not the
court ever separately considers this third step, the public's interest in re-
strictive covenants is an integral consideration of every court decision in-
volving covenants not to compete.
I. MODIFICATION OF UNREASONABLE COVENANTS
A. Introduction
With most courts today the inquiry does not end with a determination
of whether or not a covenant not to compete ancillary to an employment
contract is reasonable. Although some courts will declare the entire cove-
nant void if portions thereof are unreasonable, x'' a majority of jurisdic-
tions in the United States will study the agreement further to determine
whether it can be modified and enforced, either by application of the
"blue-pencil theory of severability" 92 or the "ile of 'reasonableness.' ,193
This discussion will survey the three views that various courts have
adopted and their reasons for preferring one to the others.'" In addition,
189. See Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
190. Blake, supra note 78, at 686-87.
191. See, e.g., Delta Corp. of Am. v. Sebrite Corp., 391 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Tenn. 1974);
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1 (1973); Richard P. Rita
Personnel Servs. Intl., Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d 79 (1972).
192. Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. IntL, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, - 191 S.E.2d 79,
81 (1972).
193. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, -, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1975).
194. A related issue is whether a court will modify a reasonable non-competition cove-
nant such that its restrictive time period will start to run from the date of final judgment
rather than from the date of termination of the employment relationship. Although this
question is outside the scope of this article, it is worthy of mention in view of the amount of
time which litigation can consume. An employer who was denied an injunction while his
case was pending may later find that although he drafted a reasonable and enforceable
agreement he has, in effect, lost his case because the restrictive period expired before final
disposition of his case, thus rendering his prayer for an injunction moot. See, e.g., Meeker v.
Stuart, 188 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1960); Tull v. Turek, 38 Del. Ch. 182, 147 A.2d 658 (1958);
Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970). At least two courts, however, have held
that once the covenant is determined to be reasonable it would be unfair not to restrain the
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decisions applying Virginia law will be examined in an attempt to ascer-
tain the Supreme Court of Virginia's position with respect to modification
of non-competition agreements ancillary to employment contracts.
B. The Three Views
Some courts refuse entirely to modify unreasonable covenants not to
compete, arguing that to do so would encourage employers to purposely
draft broad non-competition agreements with the knowledge that most
employees will respect them as written, while the proportionally few cove-
nants which are not respected will find their way into court and be pared
down until reasonable.195 A few courts, without addressing the issue of
whether this all-or-nothing policy will best protect employees from unrea-
sonable restraints, will not modify on the ground that a court may not
rewrite the parties' contract for them because to do so is "not within the
former employee from competing if he has been allowed to do so during the pendency of the
dispute. Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1966); Fullerton Lum-
ber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955). See also Cook v. Walker Chem. &
Extermination Co., 199 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1967); Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret, 338 So. 2d 885
(Fla. App. 1976). And some courts, without explanation, enjoin the defendant for the re-
strictive period beginning with the final decree. See, e.g., Maimone v. Wackenhut Corp., 329
So. 2d 332 (Fla. App. 1976); Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 465 Pa. 500, 351 A.2d 207
(1976); Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).
In Hallmark Personnel Agency, Inc. v. Jones, 207 Va. 968, 154 S.E.2d 5 (1967), the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that it could not enjoin a former employee from working for a
competing business since the eighteen month restrictive period had already passed. The
question was deemed moot and the appeal was dismissed. Id. at 970-71. However, the Hall-
mark decision may not necessarily prohibit the court from making the non-competition pe-
riod begin to run from the time of the court's final decree, even though at first glance the
case seems to stand for that proposition. In neither Hallmark nor the decisions relied upon
by the Hallmark court did the plaintiffs request that the injunctive relief begin to run from
the date of final judgment. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Hallmark Personnel Agency, Inc.
v. Jones, 207 Va. 968 (1967). See also Cumberland Bank & Trust Co. v. French, 186 Va. 53,
41 S.E.2d 499 (1947); Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 29 S.E.2d 831 (1944);
Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 602, 29 S.E. 321 (1898). In addition, there are persuasive policy
arguments favoring the view that the court should modify the contract such that the restric-
tive period begins to run on the date of final decree, including the possibility that former
employees need only litigate the controversy until it becomes moot, thus avoiding enforce-
ment of a reasonable covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court of Virginia recently
granted certiorari in Roanoke Engineering Sales, Inc. v. Rosenbaum, a case which places
this very issue before the court. Roanoke Engineering Sales, Inc. v. Rosenbaum, No. 79-153
(Va., cert. granted Mar. 14, 1980).
195. Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l., Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d 79
(1972); Blake, supra note 78, at 683. (According to Professor Blake, a court's willingness to
modify the proportionally few covenants which come to trial "smacks of having one's em-
ployee's cake, and eating it too." Id.
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judicial province as it has been traditionally understood in our law." 196 In
addition, a court may refuse to modify covenants not to compete pursu-
ant to a state restraint of trade statute prohibiting such covenants. 191
Most courts, however, will modify the covenant within the parameters
of reasonableness, which depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case."9s One popular approach9 to modifying non-competition cove-
nants in employment contracts has been by application of the "'blue-
pencil' test"200 which allows the court to enforce the reasonable portions
of the covenant if the unreasonably broad language restricting the former
employee's behavior can be stricken in such a way as to leave the reasona-
ble restrictions grammatically intact.20 1 For example, a covenant listing
four distinct geographical areas as off limits to the former employee was
partially enforced by the Supreme Court of North Carolina because the
geographical areas encompassed by the unreasonable restrictions could be
penciled through with the reasonable restriction prohibiting competition
in the town of former employment still comprising part of a valid
contract. 2 '
Courts utilizing the blue-pencil doctrine do so on the theory that they
are not rewriting the parties' contract because the remaining language to
which effect is given is that of the parties.20 3 In Eldridge v. Johnston,2G4
196. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, -, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1973).
197. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959) (noting that subse-
quent statute had overruled the "reasonableness" test adopted in Fullerton Lumber Co. v.
Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955)).
198. See Blake, supra note 78, at 629-51 for a discussion of the reasonableness test as
historically applied in restraint of trade cases.
199. It appears that adoption of or adherence to the blue-pencil doctrine is on the decline,
and that the current trend, and perhaps a majority of jurisdictions, clearly favors modifica-
tion without reference to severability. Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368
(Iowa), modified on other grounds, 190 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1971); Blake, supra note 78, at
682 n.193.
200. Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, -, 200 N.E.2d 297, 299
(1964). The term "blue-pencil" is widely used with reference to this test based on severabil-
ity, and is also referred to as "the doctrine of partial validity," Id., the "'[b]lue-pencil the-
ory of severability,'" Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l., Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, _,
191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1972), and "the rule of ... selective construction," Solari Indus., Inc. v.
Malady, 55 N.J. 571, -, 264 A.2d 53, 60 (1970).
201. See generally 6A A. CoRnIN, CoRanN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 at 67-69 (1962); 14 S.
WILisToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1647B (3d ed. 1972).
202. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pander, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961) (clauses
prohibiting competition anywhere in the United States where employer does or intends to
do business held unreasonable).
203. See generally 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 201. "By some occult process, the courts
adopting this rule convinced themselves that partial enforcement without the aid of a 'blue-
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the Oregon Supreme Court utilized notions of sanctity of contract in or-
der to justify its partial enforcement of an agreement containing illegal
provisions. 0 5
With respect to the blue-pencil test, the issue arises as to what lan-
guage is, in fact, divisible. According to Professor Corbin, "'[d]ivisibility'
is a term that has no general and invariable definition; instead the term
varies so much with the subject-matter involved and the purposes in view
that its use either as an aid to decision or in the statement of results
tends to befog the real issue. ' 'sas In Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kist-
ler, the Supreme Court of South Carolina said it would not "'artifically
split up [a single covenant] in order to pick out some part of it that
[could] be upheld.' ,207 Instead, the blue-pencil test allows partial en-
forcement "'only in the case of a covenant which is in effect a combina-
tion of several distinct covenants.' "o208
In Massachusetts, the courts apparently apply a more lax rule for de-
termining whether the requirement of divisibility has been met.0 9 For
instance, in Edgecomb v. Edmonston,21 0 the following covenant was at
issue:
3. The said Edmonston further agrees that upon the termination of this
agreement he will not, without the consent of the said Edgecomb, in writing
thereto first obtained, engage in any line of business similar to the said
Edgecomb's within the commonwealth of Massachusetts, for a period of five
years thereafter.211
According to most courts this language would not be divisible because it
fails to list specific geographical areas within the state. Nevertheless, it
pencil' would be 'making a new contract for the parties' while partial enforcement in the
wake of a 'blue-pencil' is not." Id. at 68.
204. 195 Or. 379, 245 P.2d 239 (1952).
205. See Williston & Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23 CoNN. B.J. 40 (1949) for
an analysis of the various types of "illegal" bargains and clarification of their respective
treatments, particularly with reference to unreasonable, and therefore illegal, covenants not
to compete.
206. 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 201, at 66-67.
207. 258 S.C. 429, -, 189 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1972) (quoting Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C. 324,
-, 104 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1958)) (where it would have been reasonable to restrict the former
employee from competing in three counties, the court would not do so when the covenant
prohibited competition within 100 miles of one of two named cities, an area which encom-
passed more than the three counties).
208. Id.
209. See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 397, 413-14 (1975).
210. 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926).
211. Id. at -, 153 N.E. at 100.
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was held divisible and was enforced with respect to the city of Boston and
to the former employer's customers in Massachusetts. The court noted
that:
the theory of the divisibility of space as applied to this contract is conso-
nant with public policy and is more consistent with the intent of the con-
tract than is the contention that the ... covenant is not enforceable...
because the unit of space is not so described as to indicate its component
territorial parts and divisions.212
Later Massachusetts cases following Edgecomb articulate the question in
terms of whether the covenant is "reasonably divisible."' '21s
The Restatement of Contracts adopted the blue-pencil doctrine, al-
lowing severance of terms which were divisible, but in any event disallow-
ing partial enforcement of even reasonable restrictions if "the entire
agreement [was] part of a plan to obtain a monopoly. 2 14 This latter qual-
ification insured that covenants which seriously oppose public policy
would not be enforced, even divisible portions thereof which would other-
wise be reasonable. 2 5
Although some courts still follow the blue-pencil doctrine, 21 6 most
courts which have addressed the issue have abandoned or rejected it and
its notions of divisibility in favor of enforcing unreasonable covenants not
212. Id. at -, 153 N.E. at 102.
213. Abramson v. Blackman, 340 Mass. 714, -, 166 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1960) (emphasis
added) (covenant restraining real estate salesman from using any information gotten ver-
bally or from the broker's files held not reasonably divisible).
214. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932). But see S. Williston & A. Corbin, supra
note 205 in which both professors renounced their former Restatement position in favor of
the more modern rule of reasonableness, at least with respect to covenants ancillary to the
sale of a business and arguably with respect to employment contracts. See also Blake, supra
note 78, at 646 n.70, 682 n.193.
215. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518, Comment a (1932).
216. See, e.g., Lassen v. Benton, 87 Ariz. 72, 347 P.2d 1012 (1959) (covenant unenforce-
able because not divisible); Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, 277 A.2d 512
(1971) (covenant unenforceable because not divisible); Central Keystone Plating, Inc. v.
Hutchinson, 62 IM. App. 2d 188, 210 N.E.2d 239 (1965) (covenant held divisible and re-
manded with instructions to determine what area is reasonable); Donahue v. Permacel Safe
Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 127 N.E.2d 235 (1955) (covenant unenforceable because not divisible);
Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961) (covenant held
divisible and partially enforceable); Eldridge v. Johnson, 195 Or. 379, 245 P.2d 239 (1952)
(covenant held divisible and partially enforceable); Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler,
258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972) (covenant unenforceable because not divisible); 0. Hom-
mel Co. v. Fink, 115 W.Va. 686, 177 S.E. 619 (1934) (covenant enforced as to some of the
terms, although court did not speak in terms of the blue-pencil test) (Later West Virginia
courts speak in terms of "shaving" the contract's terms. See, e.g., Pancake Realty, Co. v.
Harber, 137 W.Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1952)).
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to compete to the extent that they are reasonable.2 17 Thus, in Redd Pest
Control Company v. Heatherly,215 the former employee was enjoined
from engaging in the exterminating business in or within a fifty mile ra-
dius of Tupelo, Mississippi, the territory determined to be that where he
could use contacts from his job to take away his former employer's cus-
tomers. The restrictive covenant prohibited him from competing any-
where in the state. The court reasoned that "the legality of contracts in
restraint of trade should not turn upon the mere form of wording but
rather upon the reasonableness of giving effect to the indivisible promise
to the extent that it would be lawful. 2 9
It is said that this "rule of 'reasonableness' ,,220 is "more consistent with
the inherent concerns of a court of equity-fairness and reasonable-
ness," 221 whereas the blue-pencil doctrine is said to "emphasize form over
substance ' 222 and result in both arbitrariness and inconsistency.228 The
basic principle supporting the modern rule "is that equity should not per-
217. Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Ala. 639, 244 So.2d 585 (1971); Whittenberg v. Wil-
liams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943); John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d
548 (1952) (applying Maryland law); Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971) (rule of
reasonableness applied to restrictive covenant encompassed in a pension plan by virtue of
enactment of statute); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Hawaii 113, 551 P.2d 163 (1976) (rule
of reason test applied to determine the validity of restrictive covenants which are not per se
violations of the applicable statute); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, 499 P.2d
1252 (1972); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, modified on other grounds, 190
N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1971); Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 215 P.2d 133 (1950); Ceresia v.
Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951) (covenant ancillary to the sale of a business; however,
dicta indicates adoption of the rule with respect to employment contracts as well); Bess v.
Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977) (covenant ancillary to the sale of a business; how-
ever, dicta indicates adoption of the rule with respect to employment contracts as well);
Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (1963); R. E. Harrington,
Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945 (Mo. App. 1968) (covenant held reasonable yet dicta rejects
the blue-pencil doctrine and favors modification for "reasons of equity and common sense");
Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. 189, 426 P.2d 792 (1967); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J.
571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975)
(overruling Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964));
Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v.
Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960); Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d
587 (1968).
218. 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (1963).
219. Id. at -, 157 So. 2d at 136.
220. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, -, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1975).
221. Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252. 1255 (1972).
222. Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1977).
223. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975). The Ohio court
noted that blue-penciling can make a contract useless. "Because employers seek to insure
that provisions are not unreasonable, and therefore severed, employees may gain the benefit
of overly-lenient employment restrictions." Id. at -, 325 N.E.2d at 546.
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mit an injustice which might result from total rejection of the covenant
merely because the court disagrees with an employer's judgment as to
what restriction is necessary to protect his business."224
Courts following the modern trend are not persuaded by the assertion
that the reasonableness rule encourages "in terrorem tactics by employ-
ers."2 5 They argue instead that a limitation is imposed upon the court
which is willing to modify without reference to divisibility by virtue of the
fact that partial enforcement of even reasonable restrictions is not al-
lowed "[w]henever evidence of conscious overreaching, bad faith, monop-
olization or deliberate oppression is shown. '221
C. The Law in Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
whether it will modify, either via the blue-pencil test or the rule of rea-
sonableness, unreasonable covenants not to compete in employment con-
tracts so that they may be partially enforced.
In National Homes Corp. v. Lester Industries, Inc.,227 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, applying Virginia law, enjoined a former employee
from competing with his former employer in the state of Virginia, even
though the restrictive covenant broadly stated that the employee would
not engage "'anywhere in the United States, in any enterprise in compe-
tition with the business of National Homes Corporation.' ",228 Although at
first glance the decision seems to indicate that Virginia will modify em-
ployment covenants not to compete, this is not the case. National Homes
dealt with an agreement for the sale of a business as well as an employ-
ment contract and was later distinguished for this reason in Alston Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Associates.229
224. Eastern Distributing Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, -, 567 P.2d 1371, 1379 (1977).
225. Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972).
226. Id. (though the court would nevertheless modify the agreement if there were a "com-
pelling public interest"). Accord, Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa
1971) (agreement enforceable as long as no undue hardship on employee and no public in-
terest affected); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976) (distinguishing
covenants held void because of "an intent to oppress the employee and/or foster a
monopoly").
227. 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968).
228. Id. at 226 n.1 (emphasis added).
229. 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Va. law). Nor does National Homes stand for
the proposition that unreasonable restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of a business
may be modified and partially enforced. The covenant in National Homes was assumed to
be reasonable because the injunction was issued pursuant to a default judgment. Alston
Studios, 492 F.2d at 284. It prohibited competition in any place in the United States where
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Consequently, National Homes cannot be looked to for guidance in de-
termining whether Virginia courts may modify unreasonable non-compe-
tition covenants ancillary only to the employer-employee relationship.
However, two other opinions are particularly relevant-Richardson v.
Paxton Co., 230 a Virginia Supreme Court decision, and Alston Studios,
the aforementioned Fourth Circuit opinion.
Richardson was an action seeking to enjoin a former employee from"'entering or engaging in any branch of marine or industrial supplies,
equipment, services business' in the states of Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Maryland for a period of three years," '281 pursuant to
an agreement to the same effect entered into between the employer and
employee. The lower court awarded the injunction, but only with respect
to Virginia. 3 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed because the cove-
nant was unreasonable and unenforceable.
In light of Richardson, it appears that Virginia courts may not modify,
by either method, employment covenants not to compete. However, fur-
ther study indicates that the issue has not been fully addressed. The em-
ployer in Richardson asked the court to apply the blue-pencil test and
thus uphold the trial courts' injunction with respect to Virginia.233 How-
ever, it is unclear whether the court reversed on the ground that employ-
ment non-competition covenants must stand or fall as a whole, or because
the covenant was not divisible and therefore not partially enforceable.
The Richardson covenant would appear to be a prime candidate for
divisibility since the territory to which it refers distinctly lists four states.
However, even if Virginia alone were a reasonable territory, the opinion
indicates that the activities restrained were likewise unreasonable.23 The
language of the covenant regarding activities appears less susceptible of
divisibility since it speaks in terms of preventing the employees from "en-
gag[ing] in any branch of marine or industrial supplies,' 2 5 which would
the employer was in competition, as distinguished from throughout the United States gen-
erally. Id. In fact, the district court's decision to enforce the covenant in Virginia except for
fifteen counties, National Homes Corp. v. Lester Industries, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025, 1033
(W.D..Va. 1968), was modified to include all of Virginia because the employer's "competitive
sphere of influence" extended throughout Virginia. National Homes, 404 F.2d at 227; Alston
Studios, 492 F.2d at 284.
230. 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
231. Id. at 791, 127 S.E.2d at 114.
232. Id.
233. Brief for Appellee at 29-31, Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113
(1962).
234. 203 Va. 790, 795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962).
235. Id.
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include "activities in which [the employer itself] is not engaged."2 36 In
light of these facts, the basis for the court's decision is unclear.23 7
In addition, the employer in Richardson did not raise the issue of
whether the covenant could be partially enforced as to activity by appli-
cation of the reasonableness rule; thus, it also remains uncertain whether
the Virginia Supreme Court would be inclined to allow modification via
this method.
There is authority, however, which indicates that, if faced with the is-
sue, the Virginia Supreme Court might reject notions of modification by
any method and apply instead the all-or-nothing rule. In Alston Studios,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to enjoin a former em-
ployee from competing in the city where he had previously worked. The
covenant was held to be unreasonable because it had no geographic limi-
tation whatsoever,23 8 and the activities restricted were too broadly de-
fined.219 The court would not partially enforce the agreement, saying,"'we think the restrictive covenant must be judged as a whole and must
stand or fall when so judged.' 2240
Recognizing that the Virginia Supreme Court had not specifically ad-
dressed the issue of whether modification would be allowed, the Fourth
Circuit based its decision not to modify on two grounds. First, it stressed
that in Richardson the Virginia Supreme Court said that a non-competi-
tion agreement ancillary to an employment agreement "'is carefully ex-
amined and strictly construed before the covenant will be enforced.' "241
Second, the Alston Studios court followed Welcome Wagon v. Morris,24 2
where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applying North Carolina law
refused to modify a covenant not to compete. It justified its reliance on
Welcome Wagon by noting that the Virginia Supreme Court had relied
thereon in Meissel v. Finley.243
Nevertheless, Alston Studios is not without criticism. Its reliance on
Richardson is problematical since, as discussed above, it is unclear what
236. Id.
237. The court merely states: "Having reached this conclusion [that the restraint is un-
reasonable and unenforceable], we do not consider it necessary to discuss other questions
raised." Id.
238. 492 F.2d at 281.
239. Id. at 283.
240. Id. at 284 (quoting Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir.
1955)).
241. Id. at 283 (quoting Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117).
242. 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying N.C. law).
243. 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
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issues were decided in Richardson.2" Likewise its reliance on Welcome
Wagon is somewhat speculative since the covenant not to compete in
Meissel was found to be reasonable and the court therefore never reached
the issue of modification. In Meissel, the court looked to North Carolina
law for the purpose of adopting three criteria to be used in determining
whether a non-competition covenant is reasonable.2 4 5 Furthermore, as
Welcome Wagon has been overruled insofar as the disallowance of modi-
fication,4 6 it does not follow that the Virginia Supreme Court would
adopt its rule regarding modification.
D. Conclusion
Whether Virginia courts may modify unreasonable covenants not to
compete remains unanswered, and even if modification is to be permitted,
the issue is raised as to which, if either, method of partial enforcement is
better-the blue-pencil test or the reasonableness test. Generally, the
scope of courts' discretion has expanded tremendously, from policies en-
tirely prohibiting modification to policies allowing modification via the
rule of reasonableness. The conflict is clear, for both the reasonableness
test and the blue-pencil test are on the one hand more in keeping with
notions of freedom of contract, while on the other they foster judicial re-
writing of private contracts. Which direction the Virginia Supreme Court
will take remains to be seen.
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Introduction
It has frequently been noted that the confusion which exists in the area
of conflict of laws involving contracts is unsurpassed.241 However, it is es-
pecially necessary to be able to ascertain the applicable law in determin-
ing the enforceability of employee covenants not to compete, as it has
been seen that virtually every state has set its own standards as to when
such covenants will be enforced. This section will be concerned with the
244. See text accompanying notes 231-37 supra.
245. 198 Va. at 577, 95 S.E.2d at 186.
246. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
Courts which permit modification use more or less the same criteria as used in Welcome
Wagon for determining whether a covenant is reasonable. See, e.g., Pancake Realty Co. v.
Harber, 137 W.Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d 438 (1952). See generally Blake, supra note 78, at 629-51
for a discussion of the reasonableness test and the evolution of these criteria.
247. Morris, The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded, 6 VAND. L.
REV. 505 (1953).
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area of conflict of laws which involves the general validity4 8 of restrictive
covenants ancillary to an employment contract, since this is where both
the confusion and the majority of the litigation lie.
With regard to general validity of contracts, three different theories
have traditionally been applied to resolve the conflict of laws questions.
Some courts rule that the law of the place of the making of the contract
governs the contract, its validity, nature, interpretation and effect. 4 9
Other courts have ruled that the law of the place of performance governs
the validity of the contract,2 50 and still other courts look to the intent of
the parties to determine the applicable law.25 1 It has been noted that the
courts "have almost always been willing to rely on another appropriate
law to escape a holding of invalidity, ' 252 and, hence, the cases dealing
with this subject have been irreconcilable as the courts have applied vary-
ing laws in order to validate contracts. The situation has been further
confused as courts dealing with certain issues which are against public
policy, including the issue of employee covenants not to compete, have
held contracts invalid by applying "either the lex fori or a foreign law
notwithstanding the existence of a validating law having substantial con-
tact with the contract. 253
The following material attempts to elucidate the Virginia position on
conflict of laws in contracts which in turn indicates where the court would
stand if presented with a question regarding conflict of laws in the con-
text of an employee covenant not to compete.
248. Questions involving general validity of a contract arise when the contract is enforcea-
ble in one jurisdiction in which the parties are involved but unenforceable in another. See
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 263 (1971).
249. See, e.g., Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larkin, 299 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1962); Rich-
land Dev. Co. v. Staples, 295 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 145 (3d ed. 1977).
It should be noted that the law of the place where the contract is made is also referred to
as lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis. 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311.1
(1935).
250. See, e.g., J.H. Home & Sons Co. v. Bath Fibre Co., 272 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1959); Turner
Constr. Co. v. W.J. Halloran Steel Erection Co., 240 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1957). See generally
R. LEFLAR, supra note 249, at § 146.
It should be noted that the law of the place fixed for performance of the contract is also
referred to as lex loci solutionis. 2 J. BEALE, supra note 249, at § 311.1
251. See, e.g., Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937); Mullaly v.
Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 588 (D.N.J. 1959). See generally, R. LEFLAR,
supra note 249, at § 147.
252. Ehrenzweiz, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974 (1959).
253. Id. at 1011.
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. Validity
1. Contract Made and Performed in Same Jurisdiction
It is frequently the situation that employment contracts are executed
and performed in the same state. In such cases, it appears obvious that
the Virginia courts will apply the law of the state of both the execution
and the performance.215
It should be noted, however, that the Virginia courts have consistently
honored the intentions of the contracting parties25 5 and, hence, will apply
the law of a jurisdiction other than that of the execution and performance
if it is manifest that the parties intend that such other law should apply.
Since the court implies that the parties intended to be governed by the
law of the making of the contract if it is also to be peformed in that state,
it appears that the parties must expressly state that the law of another
jurisdiction is to govern the contract if they expect the courts to honor
this intention. Even in this situation, it is possible that the courts will
refuse to enforce the intent of the parties if there appear to be "excep-
tional circumstances evincing a purpose in making the contract to commit
a fraud on the law." 256 Hence, if it appears that the parties have inten-
tionally chosen the law of another state in order to circumvent the Vir-
ginia law regarding employee covenants not to compete, it is likely that
the court will refuse to enforce the stipulated law and, consequently, will
resort to the law of the state of execution and performance. This reason-
ing is especially applicable in situations regarding employee covenants
not to compete as the courts will construe the contracts strictly, placing
the burden upon the employer to prove their validity.2 5 Therefore, it is
probable that such provisions, being written by the employer to benefit
himself, will be disfavored by the courts and, as such, will be disregarded.
2. Contracts Made in One Place and Performed in Another
The situations that have proved to be the most confusing to the courts
have been situations where contracts have been executed in one jurisdic-
tion and performance under these contracts has been in another. As will
254. Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919). The court stated that the contract
is to be governed by the law of the state of execution unless it is to be performed elsewhere.
Therefore, it necessarily follows that if performed and executed in the same jurisdiction
then the law of that jurisdiction applies.
255. See, e.g., Tate v. Hain, 181 Va. 402, 25 S.E.2d 321 (1943); Peoples Bldg., Loan & Sav.
Ass'n v. Tinsley, 96 Va. 322, 31 S.E. 508 (1898).
256. Tate v. Hain, 181 Va. 402, 410, 25 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1943).
257. Linville v. Servisoft of Va., Inc., 211 Va. 53, 174 S.E.2d 785 (1970).
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be seen, in these situations a variety of factors, including the place of
performance, the place of execution of the contract, the intent of the par-
ties to the contract and the public policy of the forum, are weighed in
order to determine the appropriate law.
In Virginia, the courts place paramount importance upon the intent of
the parties to the contract258 and, therefore, the courts have made con-
certed efforts to discern the intent of the parties by implication where it
is not ascertainable from the express provisions of the contract. In cases
involving contracts which are performed and executed in different juris-
dictions, the Virginia courts have consistently presumed that the parties
intended the law of the state of performance to apply.2 59 From this pre-
sumption of intent the Virginia Supreme Court took the natural step
when it stated:
It is a general rule that every contract as to its validity, nature, interpreta-
tion and effect, or, as they may be called, the right, in contradistinction to
the remedy, is governed by the law of the place where it is made, unless it is
to be performed in another place, and then it is governed by the law of the
place where it is to be performed. 80
Hence, in spite of considerable authority to the contrary in cases involv-
ing employee covenants not to compete,28 1 the courts, when applying Vir-
ginia conflict of laws rules to a situation involving a covenant not to com-
pete, apparently will apply the law of the place of performance.282
An entirely different position must be taken if a contract which in-
cludes a covenant not to compete is to be performed in several states.
Here the presumption that the place of performance is intended to be the
governing law would lead to hopeless confusion. Therefore, the courts
258. See note 255 supra and accompanying text.
259. Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919); Peoples Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n
v. Tinsley, 96 Va. 322, 31 S.E. 508 (1898).
260. Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 334, 101 S.E. 240, 241 (1919).
261. See, e.g., Koehler v. Cummings, 380 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Dailey v.
Transitron Overseas Corp., 349 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd sub nom., Dailey v.
Transitron Elec. Corp., 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973); Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Blair, 10 N.C.
App. 323, 178 S.E.2d 781 (1971). In these cases, the courts held that the law of the place of
the making of the contract should control with respect to its validity.
262. See Rochester v. Rochester Corp., 316 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970), modified, 450
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971). The court followed the guidelines set down in Poole v. Perkins, 126
Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919), and held that the law of the place of performance should
apply. It should be noted, however, that while the original employment contract had been
executed in New York, the amended contract that was in question was executed in Virginia.
Hence it appears that the application of the rule from Poole was unnecessary as both the
execution and the performance were in Virginia.
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generally hold that the presumed intent of the parties is that the law of
the place of execution should govern the contract." 3 This concept has
even been extended in at least one jurisdiction to include cases where the
contract is capable of being performed in more than one jurisdiction. 2"
The court in this case held that where a corporation has branch offices in
several states and there exists a possibility that the employee may be
transferred to an office in a state other than the one in which he is per-
forming, then the court will presume that the parties intended that the
place of the execution of the contract govern the contract. 265 While it is
unlikely that the Virginia courts would go to this extreme, it is probable
that they would follow the view that the place of execution is intended to
be the governing law in situations where the contract is actually per-
formed in several jurisdictions.
An underlying principle of the doctrine of freedom of contract is that
parties should be able to choose the law that is to govern the contract.2 6
Hence, courts generally have indicated that a provision in a contract stat-
ing that the law of a state in which one party is domiciled shall govern its
interpretation will be enforced if its enforcement is not a violation of pub-
lic policy of the forum state and if such provision was not adopted with
the object of evading the otherwise applicable law.26 7 With only minor
exceptions, 6 courts when dealing with employee covenants not to com-
pete have followed the law stipulated by the parties to a contract even
263. See, e.g., Larx Co. v. Nicol, 224 Minn. 1, 28 N.W.2d 705 (1947). The court stated:
"Where the place of performance covers several states or countries, the courts generally
have held, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the parties to a contract have
intended that the law of the place of contracting should govern as to questions of validity
and legal effect." Id. at -, 28 N.W.2d at 710. While this case involved a covenant not to
compete which was contained in a contract by which an employee transferred his shares of
stock to the corporation when terminating his employment, this rule undoubtedly would
apply where an employee was to perform under employment contract in several states.
264. Credit Bureau Management Co. v. Huie, 254 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Ark. 1966). The
court held Texas law was applicable to determine the validity of a contract which was per-
formed strictly in Arkansas. However, the underlying basis of the court's decision appears to
have been to uphold the practice of the Arkansas courts of choosing the law which would
validate the contract, unless such law is contrary to strong public policy.
265. Id. at 554. Since plaintiff corporation maintained branches in Texas, then Texas law
governed the validity of the contract.
266. R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAW § 159 (1901).
267. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central
Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
268. See, e.g., H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen, 363 F. Supp. 1325 (D.C.N.Y. 1973) (An employ-
ment contract stipulated that Minnesota law should apply; however, the court applied New
York law because the employee was hired in New York, performed in New York and was
supervised in New York).
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though the contract was being performed in another jurisdiction. 69 It ap-
pears likely that the Virginia courts, with their concern with carrying out
the intent of the contracting parties, would honor stipulations by the con-
tracting parties as to the law which is to govern the validity of the
contract.
It is of paramount importance to remember that, as employee cove-
nants not to compete are a direct restraint on trade, they are inescapably
intertwined with the public policy of the state. Therefore, a set of conflict
of laws rules unique to such situations are applied when the contracting
parties seek to have a contract enforced which is more liberal than those
contracts normally allowed by the state of the forum. Without exception,
the courts have refused to apply the law stipulated by the parties, where
such application would be bontrary to the forum state's policy regarding
the admissible scope of employee covenants not to compete.2 7 This same
principle applies to cases where, in the absence of a stipulation, the con-
flict of laws rules of the forum state dictate that the controlling law is
that of another jurisdiction, and application of that law would lead to a
result contrary to the public policy of the forum state. Once again the
courts uniformly refuse to enforce such covenants.2 7 1
While no cases of this nature have been addressed by the Virginia Su-
preme Court, it is apparent that the court would refuse to enforce a con-
tract which is in violation of its public policy. The court noted its position
in such cases when it stated:
[A] State may not prohibit one of its citizens or residents from making a
contract-that is, from doing an act-in another State, nevertheless the fo-
rum State could decline to lend the aid of its courts in enforcing such con-
tract where the terms of the contract were obnoxious to its law. 27 2
Therefore it appears when dealing with contracts which contain employee
269. See, e.g., Associated Spring Corp. v. Roy F. Wilson & Avnet, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 967
(D.S.C. 1976); National Chemsearch Corp. of N.Y., Inc. v. Bogatin, 233 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.
Pa. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 349 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1965).
270. See, e.g., Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668,
97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971) (agreement that New York law would control was not given effect
when contrary to California public policy); Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d
239 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973) (court would not enforce contract under Indiana law when enforce-
ment would be contrary to public policy of Florida); Sonotone Corp. v. Ellis, 2 N.J. Super.
419, 64 A.2d 255, aff'd, 4 N.J. Super. 331, 67 A.2d 186 (1949) (New Jersey refused to honor
stipulation that New York law apply when contrary to public policy).
271. See, e.g., May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Mich. 1937), afl'd per curiam, 117
F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1940) (court refused to apply Illinois law to validate contract because to
do so would be in violation of Michigan public policy).
272. Isaac Fass, Inc. v. Pink, 178 Va. 357, 363, 17 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1941).
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covenants against competition, the Virginia courts will defer to the inten-
tions of the contracting parties, whether such intentions are express or
implied, in determining the applicable law as long as the law intended is
not contrary to the position taken by the Virginia courts. Consequently, if
the law intended to be applied is more restrictive than the Virginia'posi-
tion on the issue, the Virginia courts will apply the intended law in deter-
mining the validity of such a contract. On the other hand, if the law to be
applied is more liberal, and the covenant sought to be enforced is broader
than that allowed under Virginia law, then there appears to be little
doubt that the courts will refuse to uphold the contract on the basis that
to do so would be contrary to public policy.
C. Conclusion
Conflict of laws questions in Virginia dealing with the validity of con-
tracts are resolved in favor of the law intended by the parties. If a con-
tract is to be executed and performed in the same jurisdiction, the courts
will imply that the parties intended the law of the place of execution to
apply. If the contract is executed in one jurisdiction and is to be per-
formed in another, the courts will presume that the parties contracted
with reference to the place of performance and apply that state's law.
While the presumption may be overcome by a showing of contrary intent
in the form of a stipulation of the contracting parties, the courts never-
theless will only enforce the law of another jurisdiction to the extent that
it is not contrary to the public policy of Virginia. Therefore, each case
must be determined upon its own facts, and with the knowledge of the
law of both jurisdictions, in order to determine which is the applicable
law.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the enforceability of a covenant not to compete an-
cillary to an employment contract depends in large measure on the facts
and circumstances of each particular case. Although the courts generally
recognize that employers often have certain business interests worthy of
protection, these interests must be balanced against the ultimate effect of
a non-competition agreement on the former employee since it restricts his
opportunity to earn a livelihood. Because of these competing interests,
the tripartite test, which focuses on the needs of the employer, employee,
and the public, has found widespread approval. However, the test does
not foster predictability; it necessarily involves a close analysis of each
particular employment relationship about which a dispute has arisen.
Initially, it must be established that there was consideration supporting
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the non-competition agreement. Otherwise, the tripartite test will never
be invoked to determine whether the scope of the covenant is reasonable.
Usually consideration is not an issue of much concern where the agree-
ment preceded the commencement of the employment relationship or
where the employee's status is changed upon execution of the agreement.
However, there are differing views with respect to covenants executed
during the course of employment for which the employee receives nothing
in exchange.
A court applying the tripartite test will require that the employer show
both that he has a legitimate interest capable of and in need of protection
and that the covenant in fact reasonably protects that interest. This in-
volves an inquiry into the nature of the business and the duties per-
formed by the former employee. To restrict the employee from contacting
the employer's customers, the court will place great emphasis on whether
and to what extent the employee ever dealt with customers in the course
of his employment relationship. To restrict the employee from using
trade secrets, the court will consider whether he ever came in contact
with the secrets and whether they could in fact be used in competition.
Thus, the activity in which the employee engaged is important. Further-
more, the length of time and geographic area encompassed by the restric-
tive covenant can only be long and large enough to protect the employer's
legitimate interest.
The restraint must be reasonable with respect to the employee as well,
and again, the scope of the activity restrained, the duration of the re-
straint and the geographical limitations are the focus of the inquiry. Yet
this second part of the three-part test pays homage to the disfavor which
restraints on trade have traditionally encountered. Thus, covenants which
would significantly deprive a former employee of the opportunity to earn
a livelihood would most likely fail the test.
Finally, the covenant is evaluated in light of its effect on the public,
which has an interest in both freedom of contract and freedom of trade.
Therefore, a balancing of these competing interests is necessary. Where
the effect on the public of enforcement of the covenant would violate
public policy, the covenant is unreasonable. Such things as a shortage of
the type of services rendered by the employee or the likelihood of his
becoming a public charge would probably persuade a court that the cove-
nant is unreasonable with respect to the public.
Yet, even though the covenant may be unreasonable, an increasing
number of courts are willing to modify it such that it is reasonable and
enforceable. Some courts adhere to the blue-pencil doctrine which re-
quires that the language of the covenant be divisible, thus permitting the
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elimination of the offensive or overbroad portions and leaving the reason-
able portions of the restriction coherent and intact. The trend, however,
has been to apply the rule of reasonableness test, allowing modification
regardless of divisibility. Both views are based on notions of sanctity of
contract and the desire to give effect to the intent of the parties insofar as
would be reasonable. Nevertheless, a small number of jurisdictions hold
that an unreasonable covenant in restraint of trade is void, primarily be-
cause of the prohibition against judicial rewriting of contracts.
The area of conflicts of laws may pose special problems with respect to
covenants not to compete since such covenants inherently involve the
public policy of the forum state. Therefore, the usual conflict of laws rules
may not be applied if it appears that the parties have stipulated that the
laws of a more liberal jurisdiction should be controlling, especially if their
stipulation was for the purpose of circumventing the forum's public
policy.
In most areas of the law regarding covenants not to compete ancillary
to the employment contract, courts have devised a workable test which
takes into consideration all of the competing interests at stake. But be-
cause of these competing interests, each case will necessarily turn on its
own facts. As a result, it is difficult to predict the likelihood that a partic-
ular covenant will be enforced. This difficulty makes the drafting of such
covenants problematic indeed. However, a knowledge of the cases decided
in a particular jurisdiction should give the drafter some insight into the
factual issues on which his court will focus. And the clear lesson to be
gleaned from a review of the majority of the cases is that the more nar-
rowly tailored the covenant is to the particular facts involved, the more
likely it will pass judicial scrutiny.
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